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IN DEFENSE OF RECOUPMENT:
WHY "SETOFF" OF PREPETITION UTILITY
DEPOSITS AGAINST PREPETITION DEBT IS NOT
SUBJECT TO THE AUTOMATIC STAY
Gary E. Sullivan*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the time of filing bankruptcy, virtually all debtors owe
money to at least one utility creditor. Oftentimes the utility service
account between the utility and debtor includes a deposit which was
provided by the debtor at some point preceding bankruptcy. Such
deposits can involve substantial amounts of money, especially when
the debtor is a business concern.' The issue discussed herein is
simple-when the customer files bankruptcy, does the utility have
the right to offset the prepetition deposit against amounts owed by
that debtor to the utility for prepetition services without seeking ap-
proval of the bankruptcy court?
* Associate, Hubbard, Smith Mcllwain, Brakefield & Browder, P.C., Tuscaloosa, Ala-
bama; Adjunct Professor, University of Alabama School of Law, Tuscaloosa. This Article was
not written in preparation for, or in connection with, any specific matter in which the above-
mentioned firm or the author is counsel. All views expressed herein are solely the opinion of
the author.
See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Caldor, Inc., 117 F.3d 646 (2d Cir. 1997) (deciding
a case in which a customer's average monthly utility bill of $3.5 million prompted utilities to
demand a deposit of $5.1 million).
The present Article focuses on the recoupment and setoff rights of utilities because
of the recurring nature of fact patterns surrounding prepetition utility deposits. Whether a
creditor qualifies as a "utility" is not particularly relevant to the issue of recoupment and set-
off rights, though it is quite relevant to the subject of rights to postpetition service and pay-
ment between a debtor and the utility creditor. More specifically, the present Article does
not address the issues surrounding a utility's right to, and ability to, secure payment for post-
petition services. The issue of payment for and security of postpetition services is largely con-
trolled by Bankruptcy Code § 366. See 11 U.S.C. § 366 (1994). For a review of this subject,
see generally Cheryl F. Anderson, Proiding Adequate Assurance For Utilities Under Section
366,9 BANKR. DEV.J. 199 (1992).
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Some debtors have successfully argued that application of a
prepetition utility deposit against a prepetition debt sounds in the
nature of a setoff under § 553.3 This position constrains the utility's
ability to apply the prepetition deposit without court approval, as
the setoff of a deposit by a creditor is subject to the automatic stay.
In jurisdictions subscribing to the "setoff" view, a utility must seek
court approval before offsetting the prepetition deposit against the
amounts it is owed to prevent the possibility of being found liable
for violating the automatic stay. In situations involving small depos-
its, the cost of prosecuting a motion for relief from the automatic
stay serves as a practical bar to the utility exercising its rights.
In other jurisdictions, utilities have successfully argued that ap-
plication of a prepetition utility deposit to prepetition debt qualifies
as "recoupment." Because the exercise of recoupment rights by a
creditor is not prohibited or affected by the automatic stay, utilities
in these jurisdictions may offset a prepetition deposit without the
necessity or expense of obtaining the bankruptcy court's approval.
This Article provides an analysis of why the recoupment view
should, in virtually all circumstances, prevail.
II. THE PREPETITION UTILITY DEPOSIT DILEMMA
Many utilities require customers to post a cash security deposit
to secure payment of future utility bills. The demand for such a de-
posit may be made at the time utility service is initially established or
may be made as the result of poor pay performance by an existing
utility customer. The amount of a deposit will normally be based on
a variety of factors, most importantly the credit worthiness of a cus-
tomer as well as the anticipated level of utility consumption.4
Typically, the utility will "post" the deposit to the customer's ac-
count. Once the customer funds the deposit, the utility carries a
debt owing to the customer similar to a bank deposit account. In
other words, upon funding the deposit, the deposit itself is not
"owned" by the customer. Rather, the utility is indebted to the cus-
tomer for the deposit amount, subject to the conditions of the
See 11 U.S.C. § 553.
A deposit of one to two months of anticipated or average usage is common in the in-
dustry. In some states, the amount of a deposit that can be demanded by a utility is expressly
limited by regulation. For instance, in Indiana, an electric utility may require a two month
deposit, whereas a gas utility may require a four month deposit. See IURC Seeking to Estab-
lish Rules Setting Customer Creditworthiness, GAS UTIL. REP., Apr. 10, 1998, at 7.
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agreement dealing with application of the deposit amount to any
outstanding balance. Upon termination of the account, a utility will
typically apply the deposit amount to the final outstanding utility
bill, and either send a bill to the customer for the net amount owed,
or refund a credit.
What should a utility do with the deposit when it receives notice
that its customer has filed for bankruptcy protection? Three basic
options exist. First, and most conservatively, the utility may imme-
diately refund the deposit to the debtor and file an unsecured claim
in the bankruptcy case for the entire outstanding prepetition utility
bill. Second, the utility may file a bifurcated claim in the bank-
ruptcy case, indicating that such claim is secured to the extent of
the deposit, with the balance unsecured. Finally, the utility may ap-
ply the prepetition deposit to the outstanding prepetition balance.
If the deposit is insufficient to satisfy the outstanding prepetition
bill, the utility files a claim for the resulting balance. If application
of the deposit results in a credit in favor of the debtor, the utility
may either post this credit as part of a postpetition deposit or re-
fund the difference to the debtor.
Among the foregoing options, the choice of any utility should
(and hopefully is) dictated by how the particular bankruptcy court
will characterize its act of applying the prepetition deposit to the
outstanding prepetition bill. In jurisdictions in which courts charac-
terize the act of applying the deposit as "setoff," the utility may ei-
ther take affirmative steps to seek approval of the bankruptcy court
or be faced with the prospect of refunding the entire deposit to the
debtor. In jurisdictions in which courts view the application of the
prepetition deposit to prepetition debt as "recoupment," the utility




III. RECOUPMENT, SETOFF, AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY
A. The Automatic Stay Requires Court Approval for Creditor to
Exercise Setoff Righ ts
1. The Parameters of Setoff and § 553
The right of setoff arises when two parties owe mutual debts to
each other, and one party exercises its right to offset its claim
against the claim of the other. The theory underlying the concept
of setoff rights is to avoid "the absurdity of making A pay B when B
owes A."5 A simple example of setoff is the case of a general con-
tractor who pays the supplier of a subcontractor, and who offsets
this payment against the balance owed to the subcontractor.6
The right of one to claim setoff against another is generally
created by state common law. Although setoff is an equitable right
of a creditor based generally on state substantive law, courts in the
various states apply a generally accepted standard.7  To possess a
setoff right, a party must show that he holds a mutual obligation
against the party asserting a claim against him which is unrelated to
the transaction upon which the other party bases his claim. As for
the requirement of a "mutual obligation," the defendant seeking to
assert a right of setoff must possess a legal right against the same
party making demand of him." It is well established that a right to
setoff only exists when the party asserting the right has a claim
which arises out of a transaction unrelated to the matter upon
which plaintiff is asserting his claim.9
Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523,528 (1913).
See, e.g., In re Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc., 66 F.3d 1560, 1566-68 (10th Cir. 1995).
Although the substantive rights to setoff may involve slight variances based on state
law, these variances are unimportant in the context of this Article. This follows from the fact
that regardless of the definition or requirements of setoff in a particular jurisdiction, the ex-
ercise of setoff rights invariably requires the creditor to seek relief from the automatic stay.
See Mark VII Fin. Consultants Corp. v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1990) ("In
order to be mutual the cross demands set up ordinarily must be shown to belong individually
to defendant, with a corresponding right to sue for them in his individual name, and defen-
dant, as a general rule, cannot set off a demand on which he is not entitled to sue in his own
name.") (quoting 80 CJ.S. Set-offand Counterclaim § 48a(2) (1953)).
" See Barrett v. LFP, Inc., 1986 WL 7698, at *28 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1986) ("For a claim
to be properly treated as a setoff, it must arise out of a transaction independent of the pri-
mary claim."); Household Consumer Discount Co. v. Vespaziani, 387 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1978).
[Vol. 15
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The Bankruptcy Code generally acknowledges and preserves a
creditor's substantive right to exercise its otherwise available setoff
rights.' The applicable Code provision, entitled "Setoff," is § 553,
which provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362
and 363 of this title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to
offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim
of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commence-
ment of the 
case.F
As made express by this provision, the Code acknowledges only
the right of a creditor to setoff a mutual prepetition, and not post-
petition, debt. The requirement in § 553 that such debts be
"mutual" mirrors the mutuality requirement of setoff as established
by substantive state law.'"
Some courts have held that a postpetition debt may not be set-
off against a prepetition debt under the terms of § 553.'3 Courts so
holding reason that the "mutuality" requirement is missing, as the
debtor-in-possession is viewed as a legal entity distinct from the
debtor.'" In this way, the Code alters, rather than preserves, the set-
off rights of a creditor under state law.'" The Code also provides
express exceptions to the right of a creditor to setoff prepetition
debts, and these exceptions to some extent track the logic and op-
eration of the preference provisions of § 547."
" See In re Patterson, 967 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1992); In re Whitaker, 173 B.R. 359
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
S11 U.S.C.§553(a) (1994).
For purposes of setoff under § 553, "mutuality" requires: (1) debts are in the same
right; (2) debts are between the same parties; and (3) parties stand in the same capacity. See
In re Donnay, 184 B.R. 767, 787 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995).
See, e.g., In re Bram, 179 B.R. 824 (Bankr E.D. Tex. 1995).
" Other courts have chosen to read between the lines of § 553 by holding that a credi-
tor may setoff mutual postpetition obligations. See, e.g., In re Apex Int'l Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,
155 B.R 591 (Bankr. M.D. Fla 1991).
See, e.g., In re Gehrke, 158 B.R_ 465 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1993).
There are three specific exceptions to a creditor's ability to setoff a prepetition debt
owing to a debtor against the debtor's prepetition claim against the creditor. The first is that
no such setoff is permitted if the creditor's claim against the debtor is disallowed. See 11
U.S.C. § 553(a) (1). This exception parallels the substantive law of setoff to the extent it re-
quires the creditor to prove the existence and validity of his claim against the debtor. One of
the other two exceptions mirrors the preference provisions of § 547. Section 553(a)(3),
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL [Vol. 15
2. Section 362 (a) (7) and the Exercise ofSetoff Rights
While the Bankruptcy Code preserves a creditor's substantive
right to perform setoff against a mutual debt owing to and by the
debtor, the Code does erect a procedural hurdle. This is accom-
plished by § 362 (a) (7), which provides:
(a) [The filing of a bankruptcy petition] operates as a stay, applica-
ble to all entities, of-
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim of the
17debtor ....
This section clearly brings the exercise of setoff rights by a
creditor within the ambit of the automatic stay. The purpose of
the automatic stay in preventing a creditor from unilaterally exercis-
ing setoff rights without court approval is to preserve an orderly dis-
tribution of assets and to provide the debtor with a breathing spell
from actions by creditors. 9 Congress's use of the legal term-of-art
"setoff" in § 362(a) (7), is consistent with bankruptcy courts holding
that this section does not operate as a stay to creditors exercising
rights of recoupment. °
based on the improvement of position theory of § 547, invalidates setoff in circumstances in
which the debt owed to the debtor by the creditor was incurred: (1) within 90 days before the
bankruptcy filing; (2) while the debtor was insolvent; and (3) for the purpose of obtaining a
right of setoff against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (3). The third exception invalidates
a setoff if the creditor's claim was obtained from a party other than the debtor either within
90 days before the bankruptcy filing while the debtor was insolvent, or postpetition. See I 1
U.S.C. § 553(a) (2).
" 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (7).
is Depending on the nature of the creditor's and debtor's rights and obligations, the
exercise of setoff rights may also be stayed by § 362(a) (4). This section provides that the fil-
ing of bankruptcy operates as a stay of "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against
property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4). In other words, depending on the nature of
the rights of the parties involved, an act which may constitute a setoff proscribed by
§ 362(a) (7) may also violate § 362(a) (4). See In re Moreira, 173 B.R. 965 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1994).
" See In re Homan, 116 B.R. 595, 602 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) ( "Conditioning a credi-
tor's exercise of a potential setoff to the Code's requirement that the creditor first obtaIn re-
lief from the stay is consistent with an acknowledged purpose of the Code to grant a debtor
an immediate breathing spell, free from creditor pressure."); see also In re Corland Corp.,
967 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1992).
20 See discussion infra part V.B.
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In light of § 362 (a) (7), creditors of the bankrupt are required
to seek bankruptcy court approval as a prerequisite to exercising
their setoff rights. This approval is sought in the form of a motion
for relief from the automatic stay." Failure of a setoff creditor to
seek and procure relief from the automatic stay can lead to draco-
nian consequences, as the Code allows for the recovery of damages
by an individual debtor, which can include attorney fees as well as
punitive damages.22 The possibility of facing liability for violating
the automatic stay by falling to seek bankruptcy court approval pro-
vides a creditor wrestling with the setoff issue a powerful incentive
to err on the side of seeking bankruptcy approval of the proposed
transaction. '3
B. Recoupment is not Subject to the Automatic Stay
1. Recoupment in General
Much like setoff, the doctrine of recoupment is a common law
concept which dates to legal antiquity.24 Recoupment tracks the re-
quirements of setoff in that it is asserted as an equitable defense
against a party with whom the defendant has dealt.5 Unlike a setoff,
however, recoupment requires that the defense asserted arise out of
A See In re Patterson, 967 F.2d 505, 509 (11th Cir. 1992) ("In order to exercise a valid
right of setoff, a creditor must move the court for relief from the stay."); In re Women's
Technical Inst., 200 B.R. 77 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996); In re Morgan, 196 B.R. 758, 760 (Bankr.
E.D. Ky. 1996) ("A party seeking to setoff a mutual pre-petition debt as permitted by 11 U.S.C.
[§] 553 must secure a lifting of the automatic stay.").
; See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).
Courts have awarded substantial damages for "willful" violations of the automatic stay.
See, e.g., In re Miller, 200 B.R. 415 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) ($10,000 in actual and punitive
damages); In re Toll, 175 B.R. 406 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1994) (punitive damages of S10,000); In
re Coats, 168 B.R_ 159 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (damages award included $34,000 in attorney
fees).
' See Hubley Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Ives, 70 A. 615, 616 (Conn. 1908) ("Equity recog-
nizes rights of set-off which go far beyond those which the early legislation of England and of
Connecticut introduced in actions at common law."). The doctrine of recoupment is simi-
larly ancient. See Keegan v. Kinare, 14 N.E. 14 (Ill. 1887); Charley v. Potthoff, 95 N.W. 124
(Wis. 1903).
" See Jeffrey L. Schwartz, When Is The Same Contract Not the 'Same Transaction'?,
BvNKR. STRATEGIST, OcL 1996, at 1 ("An equitable doctrine, recoupment basically allows a
party to show that, because of circumstances arising out of the transaction in question, he is
not liable for the full amount of the claim.").
1998]
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the same transaction or matter upon which plaintiff bases his
claim.
26
The requirement that a defense arise out of the "same transac-
tion" is the very essence of the doctrine of recoupment. While in
large part the victim of legal obsolescence,27 the spirit of recoup-
ment survives today outside of the bankruptcy context in the Rules
of Civil Procedure as the "compulsory counterclaim" provision of
Rule 13.2 The federal version of Rule 13(a) provides that a defen-
dant must assert a counterclaim "if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim...."2 9  Similarly, the doctrine of setoffs survives in the
"permissive counterclaim" provision of Rule 13(b), which provides
that a claim "may state as a counterclaim any claim against an op-
posing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."30 As can be dis-
cerned from a comparison of these two rules, recoupment differs
from setoff in two important respects. First, a matter properly as-
sertable as recoupment must be asserted defensively against a plain-
tiff's claim or it will be waived. Second, a recoupment right prop-
erly asserted enjoys immunity from the various statutes of
limitations, as it may "relate back" when asserted as a counterclaim.
In sum, recoupment is fairly viewed as a species related to set-
off. Like a setoff, recoupment involves the defensive right to offset
a debt against one owing a mutual debt to the party asserting the
recoupment right. Unlike a setoff, for the right to recoup to exist,
the asserting party must possess a right against the debtor that arose
in or as an offspring of the "same transaction."
" See Harlan v. St. Paul M&M Ry., 18 N.W. 147, 148 (Minn. 1884) ("If the defendant
can show that the plaintiff himself has violated some stipulation of the same contract sued on,
he may recoup his damages arising from such breach .... ").
" While the common law doctrines of setoff and recoupment have lost relevance as a
result of the adoption of standardized rules of civil procedure, most jurisdictions continue to
recognize the substantive right of a party to assert those rights. See, e.g., Constantino v. New
York, 415 N.Y.S.2d 966, 969 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1979).
See Coplay Cement Co. v. Willis & Paul Group, 983 F.2d 1435, 1440 (9th Cir. 1993)
(characterizing recoupment as the "ancestor" of the Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaim);
Constantino, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 969 ("The right to plead recoupment as a defense remains in-
tact, notwithstanding the subsequent absorption of the common law doctrines of setoff and
recoupment by the present statutory definition of counterclaim.").
FED. R. CIV. 13 (a).
FED. R. CIV. 13 (a) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 15
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2. Recoupment in Bankruptcy
In the context of bankruptcy, the doctrine of recoupment pro-
vides a creditor with a rarely sanctioned method for obtaining pref-
erential treatment over other creditors. Many creditors overlook
recoupment as a possible vehicle for recovery from the debtor not
requiring the involvement of the bankruptcy court.3'
Furthermore, while recoupment is a defensive doctrine, a
creditor may assert its rights without waiting for the debtor to bring
a suit."
The value of recoupment is grounded in the Code's treatment,
or more accurately, nontreatment, of recoupment rights. Specifi-
cally, the Code fails to provide mention of, much less a system for
dealing with, common law recoupment rights." Nonetheless, courts
have virtually uniformly agreed34 that the Code preserves the right
of a creditor to claim, and unilaterally exercise, any common law
recoupment rights available against the debtor." As such, the "same
transaction" requirement within the context of bankruptcy provides
the foundation for the equitable right of recoupment against the
debtor: "[A]Illowing the creditor to recoup damages simply allows
the debtor precisely what is due when viewing the transaction 'as a
whole.'"
'I See Drew S. Norton, Recoupment From Last in Line to First in Line, AM. BANKR.
INST. J.,June 1997, at 32 ("One of the most overlooked methods for what amounts to a per-
missible preference is the common law concept of recoupment-and the best part is that you
do not need court approval.").
1 See In re Flagstaff Realty Assocs., 60 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1995).
See In re University Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1079 (3d Cir. 1992) (The Bankruptcy
Code does not contain a recoupment provision.").
" The uniformity of this view is challenged by an occasional conscientious objector.
See, e.g., In re Centergas, Inc., 172 B.R 844, 851-52 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that
recoupment represents an impermissible violation of the bankruptcy policy of equal distribu-
tion).
"' See Newbery Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1996); In re
U.S. Abatement Corp., 79 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996); Flagstaff RealtyAssoc., 60 F.3d 1031; In re
Smith, 737 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1984); In re 105 E. Second St. Assocs., 207 B.R. 64 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1997).
" United Structures of Am. v. G.R.G. Eng'g, 9 F.3d 996,999 (1st Cir. 1993).
19981
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IV. THE COURTS SPEAK
The issue of whether a prepetition utility deposit may be offset
by a utility against prepetition debt as recoupment without court in-
volvement or approval has been the subject of substantial contro-
versy. Some courts refuse to allow utilities to make a unilateral off-
set under the claim of recoupment rights. Other courts have
agreed with utilities that the offset of a prepetition deposit qualifies
as recoupment, and can be pursued by a utility without the necessity
of court involvement.
A. The Setoff Camp
Some courts have held that a utility may not offset a prepetition
utility deposit against the outstanding prepetition bills of a debtor
without court approval. Perhaps the leading case espousing the
"setoff" view is In re Village Craftsman.37
The facts in Village Craftsman are straightforward. In June and
July of 1989, a customer provided two checks to its electric utility
creditor in the total amount of $12,650 as a security deposit to offset
future bills.38 More than ninety days later, the customer filed for
bankruptcy protection. The utility filed a proof of claim for prepeti-
tion services in the amount of $13,393.14." Several months after
the petition was filed, the utility requested that the debtor provide it
with a postpetition security deposit in the amount of $11,000. Upon
inquiry, the debtor learned that the utility had applied the prepeti-
tion deposit to its outstanding prepetition balance. The debtor re-
sponded by filing a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking to
find the utility in violation of the automatic stay and seeking to
compel the utility to reestablish the security deposit.0
The issue central to the court's determination of whether the
utility had violated the automatic stay was whether such application
of the utility deposit was a setoff or recoupment. The court began
its analysis with a brief overview of setoff under § 553 and common
37 160 B.R. 740 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993). See also In re Utica Floor Maintenance, Inc., 41
B.R 941 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying setoff analysis to utility's request to offset prepetition de-
posit against debtor's prepetition bill).
See Village Craftsman, 160 B.R at 742.
See id. at 743.
See id. at 744.
[Vol. 15
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law recoupment rights.' Citing § 362 (a) (7), the court then noted
that a creditor "cannot unilaterally setoff postpetition against a
prepetition claim of a debtor without first obtaining court approval
in the form of relief from the automatic stay."'
Turning to recoupment, the court conceded that unlike a set-
off, "[r]ecoupment is an exception to the general rule that debts
which arise prepetition may not be satisfied postpetition without ob-
taining relief from the automatic stay." 3 Noting that setoff and re-
coupment rights are determined by state law, the court then turned
to the definition of recoupment under New Jersey law and found
that:
NewJersey law defines recoupment as... "the reduction of an offset-
ting claim arising out of exactly the same transaction .... " Recoup-
ment is distinguishable from setoff in that the latter involves an af-
firmative recovery on a claim that may be independent of the
transaction upon which the plaintiffs claim is based. While recoup-
ment may be used only to reduce or extinguish the plaintiff's recov-
ery, setoff may be awarded for any amount to which the defendant is
entitled.4
The court determined that in light of New Jersey's definition of
recoupment, the utility's act in applying the prepetition deposit to
the prepetition debt was in the nature of setoff rather than recoup-
ment.4 5 In support of its conclusion, the court made two observa-
tions. First, the court reasoned that because each party can recover
an amount by which its claim exceeds the others, the utility's rights
in its security deposit were more in the nature of a setoff rather than
recoupment. Second, the court reasoned that the posting of a secu-
rity deposit and the incurring of subsequent utility bills do not arise
from "exactly the same transaction" within the meaning of New Jer-
sey law."6
See id. at 745-46.
Id. at 746 (citing United States on Behalf of I.RS. v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767, 773 (3rd
Cir. 1983); In reArt Metal U.SA., Inc., 109 B.R 74, 83 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1989)).
" Id.
Id. (quoting Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Swaggerty, 432 A.2d 512,516 (NJ. 1981)).
* See id.
'" See id. The court failed to explain or comment on how a deposit and the open ac-
count which it secures are not part of "exactly the same transaction."
1998]
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Finally, the court in Village Craftsman briefly acknowledged
and rejected other cases in which courts held that the application of
a prepetition utility deposit was in the nature of recoupment.7 In
rejecting the views of the "recoupment" courts, the court provided
two justifications. First, the court noted that none of the
"recoupment" cases applied or analyzed New Jersey substantive law
on recoupment and setoff.48 Second, and significantly, the court
noted that in all of the "recoupment" cases, the courts failed "to dis-
cuss the fact that a security deposit which was posted prepetition by
a debtor and which had not been applied to the debt when the peti-
ton was filed is cash collateral as defined by the Code Section
363 (a)."49 The court held that viewing application of such a deposit
as recoupment rather than setoff would undermine the "purposes
of' the cash collateral provisions. 50
Another bankruptcy court also treated the application of a
prepetition utility deposit to prepetition debt as a setoff in the case
of In re Cole.51 The precise issue in Cole was whether a consumer
debtor was entitled to have a prepetition utility deposit, which was
claimed as an exempt asset, applied to satisfy a utility's demand for
postpetition adequate protection under § 366. The debtor had a
prepetition deposit in the amount of $175.98 posted to her prepeti-
tion utility account.Y Upon filing bankruptcy, the debtor included
her interest in this deposit under her claimed exemptions, and the
utility did not object to this claim. After the debtor had filed bank-
ruptcy, the utility demanded a postpetition deposit in the amount of
$265 as adequate protection under § 366. The debtor requested
that the bankruptcy court require the utility to apply the prepetition
deposit as a postpetition deposit. The utility claimed that it had the
right to setoff the prepetition utility deposit against the prepetition
debt.
5 3
17 See id. at 747 ("There is a divergence of authority in other jurisdictions on the issue





SI 104 B.R. 736 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989); accord In re Utica Floor Maintenance, Inc., 41
B.R. 941 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
See Cole, 104 B.R. at 736.
Although the court treated application of the prepetition utility deposit as setoff, such
treatment apparently was the result of acquiescence by the utility. Whether asserted by the
utility or not, the court did not directly analyze the issue of whether the utility's application of
[Vol. 15
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The Cole court held that because the debtor's prepetition de-
posit with the utility was claimed as an exempt asset, the utility had
no right to setoff this deposit against the debtor's prepetition utility
bill. In so holding, the court found that the debtor's right to claim
an asset as exempt under the laws of Maryland preempted the util-
ity's right to effectuate a setoff under § 553.54
B. The Recoupment Camp
Several courts have concluded that the application of a prepeti-
tion utility deposit to prepetition debt constitutes the exercise of re-
coupment rights by the utility.
The leading case espousing the recoupment view is In re
McMahon. ' The facts in McMahon are typical. Here, the cus-
tomer paid the utility a $6,000 deposit on April 4, 1994. On April
10, 1995, the customer filed chapter 13 bankruptcy. On May 16,
1995, with full knowledge of the customer's bankruptcy and without
permission or approval from the bankruptcy court, the utility ap-
plied the deposit to the unpaid prepetition balance. On August 11,
1995, the bankruptcy court held that the utility's unilateral applica-
tion of the deposit to debtor's prepetition account was a setoff in
violation of the automatic stay.6 Despite this finding, the bank-
ruptcy court provided an ex post facto "approval" of this "setoff' by
not requiring the utility to return this deposit. On motion of the
debtor, the bankruptcy awarded debtor $500 in attorney fees for the
utility's violation of the automatic stay." The utility appealed this
decision.
The appeals court began its review of this matter by crystalizing
the issue of whether the utility's application of the deposit was setoff
or recoupment. The appeals court acknowledged the role of re-
coupment in bankruptcy:
this deposit was a recoupment.
See Cole, 104 B.R_ at 740.
. 129 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1997).
See id. at 95.
,7 See id. The court refused to award the debtor punitive damages.
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It is well settled... that a bankruptcy defendant can meet a plaintiff-
debtor's claim with a counterclaim arising out of the same transac-
don, at least to the extent that the defendant merely seeks recoup-
ment. Recoupment permits a determination of the just and proper
liability on the main issue and involves no element of preference.5 8
The court noted that while setoff is subject to the automatic stay,
exercise of common law recoupment rights by a creditor is not.
The court then acknowledged that the recoupment rights of
the utility are defined by New York law and turned its focus thereto.
Quoting a New York Court of Appeals opinion, the court in McMa-
hon provided New York's definition of recoupment:
Recoupment means a deduction from a money claim through a proc-
ess whereby cross demands arising out of the same transaction are al-
lowed to compensate one another and the balance only to be recov-
ered. Of course, such a process does not allow one transaction to be
offset against another, but only permits a transaction which is made
the subject of a suit by a plaintiff to be examined in all its aspects, and
judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transac-
tion as a whole59
After citing this definition, the court focused on the require-
ment that recoupment involves claims arising out of "the same set of
transactions. " 60 Applying New York's definition of recoupment, the
court concluded that the "deposit plainly arose out a single electric-
ity contract between the debtor and [the utility] .,,61
Another court also characterized the offset of a prepetition util-
ity deposit against prepetition debt as "recoupment" in Brooks Shoe
Manufacturing Co. v. United Telephone Co." The facts in Brooks
Shoe involve a typical prepetition utility deposit securing a prepei-
tion utility account. On September 11, 1981, the debtor provided
its telephone utility creditor with a deposit in the amount of $15,000
to secure future performance.3 On October 23, 1981, the debtor
Id. at 96 (quoting Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 265 n.2 (1993)).
Id. (quoting National Cash Register Co. v.Joseph, 86 N.E.2d 561, 562 (N.Y. 1949)).
Id. (citing Constantino v. State, 415 N.Y.S.2d 966, 969 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1979)).
Id. at 97.
" 39 B.R. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See also In re Miner Indus., Inc., 119 B.Rt 6 (Bankr.
D.RI. 1990).
'3 See Brooks Shoe, 39 B.R. at 981. It is noteworthy that the debtor was not required to
provide this deposit at the time the telephone service account was established. Rather, the
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filed bankruptcy. The utility creditor applied this deposit against
the outstanding prepetition arrearage in November 1981. The
debtor maintained that the telephone utility's act in applying the
deposit was a setoff under § 553 in violation of the automatic stay.
The court in Brooks Shoe disagreed with the characterization
of the offset as a "setoff." The court began by noting that "the dis-
tinction is between truly independent debts, which give rise to setoff
rights, and reciprocal obligations arising from the same transaction
or series of transactions, which give rise to recoupment."'
Importantly, the court characterized the deposit as a variety of
"advanced pay" on the part of debtor.65 The court then differenti-
ated a utility deposit from a deposit with a bank or financial institu-
tion:
It seems to me that much of the confusion engendered in this case is
attributable to attempting to equate a security deposit such as that in-
volved herewith bank deposits. In the latter situation, the depositor
has unfettered access to the funds at all times, and whatever obliga-
tion the bank might seek to set off is truly an independent debt.
Even more importantly, such independent offsetting obligation would• . 66
almost inevitably prove to have been an antecedent debt.
The court concluded that the utility was well within its recoupment
rights in offsetting the prepetition deposit against the prepetition
bill. 7
Finally, in In re Norsal Industries, Inc.,6 a court characterized
the offset of a deposit against prepetition debt as recoupment. As
debtor was required to fund the deposit only after failing to make timely paynents to the
telephone utility. See id.
Id. at 982.
See id. (" ,iewed realistically, the creation of the Deposit on September 11, 1981,
seems virtually indistinguishable from the debtors having paid in advance for its telephone
service.").
- Id. at 983.
1. Interestingly, one court was faced with the situation in which the proverbial shoe was
on the other foot. See In re Public Serv. Co., 107 B.R. 441 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989). In this case,
a public utility filed bankruptcy, and the state attorney general filed an action in the bank-
ruptcy court for the utility-debtor to return certain utility deposits to customers under the
theory of recoupment. The court noted that "[t]here is little question that the deposits are
part of a single electricity contract that each... customer had with [the debtor utility]." Id. at
445. The court concluded that the customers, postured as creditors of the debtor utility, were
entitled to a return of their security deposits. See id. at 447-48.
147 B.R. 85 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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with the foregoing cases, the court was required to determine
"whether [the utility] violated the automatic stay imposed by 11
U.S.C. § 362 when it set off a pre-petition deposit it was holding
against [the debtor's] pre-petition debt."69 The court commented
on the novelty of this issue:
Despite what must be the ubiquitousness of the issue raised here, that
is whether a utility company can set off a pre-petition deposit against
a pre-petition debt, there is surprisingly little case law on the subject.
One explanation may be that ordinarily the utility seeks relief from
stay so that it can set off the pre-petition deposit against the pre-
petition debt and relief is routinely granted. In this case, however,
[the utility] made no application for relief from stay and its represen-
tative stated in court that the practice which it followed here is one
which is its customary and usual one, that is to simply reduce its pre-
petition claim by the amount of pre-petition deposit and file a claim
for the balance. 1
The court then noted that the issue of whether the utility had
violated the automatic stay turns squarely on whether its action in
offsetting the deposit was a recoupment or setoff.7l To make this
determination, the Norsal court next turned its sight to the issue of
"whether the deposit for utility services and the payment for utility
services arose out of the same transaction." 72
The debtor argued that the deposit was not part of the same
transaction because it was required to make three separate deposits
over a period of time.73 The debtor also attempted to reject other
cases finding utility deposits and accounts as part of the "same
transaction" on the basis that its dispute was governed by New York
law, whereas the other cases were based on the law of different
states. The court discarded each of these arguments and held that
the utility properly recouped the prepetition deposit against the
debtor's prepetition utility bills.74
' Id. at 86.
" Id. at 88.






V. WHY RECOUPMENT SHOULD PREVAIL
A. Reliance on Differences in State Law Definitions of
Recoupment is Misplaced
The law of recoupment in the context of a utility offsetting a
customer's deposit inescapably requires application of state law.
While most states apply the generally accepted common law stan-
dard of recoupment,' 5 meaningful differences exist. Specifically,
the requirement that the right to recoupment arise out of "the same
transaction" has been finessed by courts in certain jurisdictions.
Some courts construe this requirement liberally and merely require
that defendant's claim against plaintiff arise out of the same transac-
tion or series of transactions or occurrences. Other courts apply a
restrictive version of the "same transaction" requirement, announc-
ing from time to time that a recoupment right must arise out of the
"identical transaction" upon which plaintiff bases his claim.
In determining whether the offset of a utility deposit qualifies
as "recoupment," a bankruptcy court's reliance on the "same trans-
action" requirement of its particular state is often misplaced. While
it is true that the definition of recoupment varies by state, cryptic
references to this fact are often made in conjunction with a failure
to address the issue of whether a utility deposit and utility account
are part of the "same transaction." In other words, courts desiring to
characterize the offset of a utility deposit as a "setoff' may be
tempted to reject "recoupment" cases by making the distinction that
such cases are based on other state's laws. A predictable conse-
It is universally accepted that defensive recoupment "refers to a defendant's right in
the same action, to cut down the plaintiff's demand, either because the plaintiff has not com-
plied with some cross obligation of the contract on which he or she sues or because the plain-
tiff has violated some legal duty in the making or performance of that contract." 20 AM. JUR.
2D Recoupment or Reconvention § 5 (1995). Although the common law doctrine of re-
coupment is indeed ancient, courts continue to adhere to the well established definition.
See, e.g., Sloan v. Kubitsky, 712 A.2d 966, 968 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Lofchie v. Washington
Square Ltd. Partnership, 580 A.2d 665, 667-68 (D.C. 1990); Atkins v. Rybovich Boat Works,
561 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1990); Cox v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1306,
1315 (I11. App. Ct. 1993); Norwest Bank Minn. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 481 N.W.2d 875
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Ed Miller & Sons, Inc. v. Earl, 502 N.W.2d 444,452 (Neb. 1993); M&D
Masonry, Inc. v. Universal Sur. Co., 572 N.W.2d 408,414 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997); Enrico & Sons
Contracting v. Bridgemarket Assocs., 675 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352-53 (1998); Kline v. Blue Shield,
556 A.2d 1365, 1366-1369 (Pa. 1989); Howard v. Abernathy, 751 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1988); Reid v. Reid, 409 S.E.2d 155, 159 (Va. C. App. 1991).
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quence of this position is to refrain from any meaningful analysis of
whether a deposit and account are, in fact, part of the "same trans-
action." This truth is illustrated by an analysis of Vilage Craftsman.
In this case, the court made the naked assertion that the
debtor's utility deposit and utility account were not part of "exactly
the same transaction," as that phrase is defined by NewJersey law. 6
Defending its conclusion that application of this deposit by the
utility was a "setoff," the court rejected a contrary line of cases on
the basis that those cases were not based on New Jersey's law. 7
While in reality, New Jersey law on recoupment is virtually indistin-
guishable from the other various states, the court, without explana-
tion, excused itself from embracing any meaningful "same transac-
tion" analysis on the basis that New Jersey law was somehow
different.78
See In reVillage Craftsman, 160 B.R. 740,746 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993).
See id. at 747. Interestingly, the case cited by the court in Village Craftsman as estab-
lishing New Jersey's law on recoupment was Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Swaggerty, 432 A2d 512
(N.J. 1981). The Swaggerty court, noting that NewJersey's law on recoupment requires a de-
fense to arise out of "exactly the same transaction," determined that a Truth In Lending
counterclaim against a bank qualified as recoupment. See Swaggerty, 432 A.2d at 516-17. In
other words, the Swaggerty court held that a counterclaim created by a federal statute and a
loan transaction were part of the "same transaction" for purposes of recoupment. In light of
the somewhat attenuated relationship between these claims, it is extremely difficult to under-
stand how the Village Craftsman court relied on Swaggerty to conclude that a utility account
and a deposit securing performance of such account are not part of the "same transaction."
See Village Craftsman, 160 B.R. at 747. While the court failed to explain why a utility
account and deposit are not part of the same transaction, other case law from New Jersey has
interpreted the "same transaction" quite broadly. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Georgian, Ltd.,
559 A.2d 872 (NJ. 1989). In this case, a customer borrowed money from a bank, and failed
to make timely payments. The bank filed suit in New Jersey state court, and the customer
asserted a counterclaim on the basis that the bank wrongfully honored a series of forged
checks. The court held that under New Jersey law, "[t]he three elements of equitable re-
coupment are: (1) [a] single transaction, as opposed to related or connected transactions; (2)
[a]n identity of interest among parties; and (3) [a] need to balance the equities." Id. at 875.
The court then concluded that although the loan and checking account of the customer were
distinct, for purposes of the "same transaction" requirement of recoupment, the court rea-
soned that "[it would be farfetched to conclude that any liability on [the customer's] part on
the loans arises out of merely a connected or related transaction." Id. If under New Jersey
law, a loan to a customer and a checking account to a customer are part of the "same transac-
tion," the conclusion that a utility account and a deposit securing that account are not part of
the "same transaction" is baffling.
In Defense of Recoupment
B. A Utility Deposit and Account are Quintessentially the "Same
Transaction"
Whether a utility may offset a prepetition deposit against prepe-
tition debt as recoupment depends almost entirely on the meaning
of the term "same transaction." While seemingly clear, the term
"same transaction" has been the subject of much interpretation.
A review of bankruptcy cases illustrates situations outside the
utility deposit context in which courts have allowed creditors to ex-
ercise recoupment rights on the basis that cross claims are part of
the "same transaction." For instance, the court allowed a lessee to
withhold lease payments under the doctrine of recoupment in In re
Holford."' In this case, the lessee maintained that the debtor, its
landlord, had committed fraud in the inducement in entering the
subject lease." The lessee withheld payments to the debtor in an ef-
fort to recoup its damages. The court noted that the lessee "used
rental payments due under the lease to recoup losses caused by
fraud in the inducement of that same lease."8 The court concluded
that "clearly, the two amounts arose out of the same transaction.""
In holding that the lessee had the right to recoup its damages, the
court subscribed to a broad definition of the "same transaction" re-
quirement, noting that "It]here need not have been any express
contractual right to withhold payments for the transaction to be a
recoupment.""
Similarly, another court upheld a contractor's act in offsetting pay-
ments to the debtor- subcontractor in In re A&C Electric Co.84 In
analyzing the contractor's claim, the court provided a garden variety
articulation of the doctrine of recoupment:
Recoupment is a mechanism by which a party may calculate the
proper amounts due from it by offsetting obligations which arise from
the same transaction and which are essentially a defense to debtor's
claim. The essential element for recoupment is that the debts must
arise from the same transaction.
The justification for the recoupment doctrine is that where the
creditor's claim against the debtor arises from the same transaction as
896 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1990).




211 B.tR 268 (Bankr. N.D. IlM. 1997).
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the debtor's claim, it is essentially a defense to the debtor's claim
against the creditor rather than a mutual obligation, and application
of the limitations on set-off in bankruptcy would be inequitable. 85
The debtor's primary argument against recoupment relied on the
fact that the contractor's claim was based on extra work performed
under the terms of the controlling subcontract, and that because
the extra work was not explicitly addressed in the subcontract, the
cross claims did not arise from the same transaction.86
Rejecting this position, the court noted that the terms of the
subcontract were flexible, and allowed the contractor to make
changes and order extra work."7 The court concluded that "[i]n es-
sence, changes or extras are simply an extension of the original
contract."' The court found that the contractor was allowed to re-
coup its payments as arising under the "same transaction" as the
debtor's cross claim.89
A contractor also asserted recoupment as a defense in an adver-
sary proceeding by the debtor-subcontractor in In re Newbery
Corp.9" The contractor had used the debtor's tools and equipment
postpetition, and the debtor filed an adversary proceeding seeking
payment of rent for the contractor's use.9' The contractor asserted
that it was allowed to recoup damages based on the debtor's breach
of the subcontract. The terms of the subcontract did not address
any right on the part of the contractor to use or rent the debtor's
equipment and tools.
92
Although the subcontract did not provide a right on part of the
contractor to rent the debtor's equipment, the court in Newbery
concluded nonetheless that the contractor's cross claim was part of
the "same transaction" as debtor's claim for rent.99 The court sup-
ported this conclusion by noting that under the subcontract, con-
tractor had a duty to mitigate damages, and that its use of the
Id. at 273 (citations omitted).
See id. at 274.
See id.
SId.
' See id. at 275.
145 B.R 998 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1992), withdrawn, 161 B.R 999 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
9' See id. at 1000.
' See id.
' See id. at 1001.
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debtor's equipment and tools was engaged for that purpose."' The
court explained its reasoning as follows:
Because [the contractor] had a duty to mitigate damages, both
claims arise out of the same transaction. [The contractor] hired an-
other contractor and allowed the new contractor to use the Debtor's
tools and equipment in order to mitigate damages to the extent rea-
sonably possible. The Debtor's claim for rents would not have arisen
had it not been for [the contractor's] use of the equipment. [The
contractor] would not have used the Debtor's tools and equipment
had it not been for the Debtor's breach of contract .... [Therefore],
the two claims are integral to each other and cannot be severed.9
Based on the court's conclusion that the claim for rent and
breach of contract claim arose out of the "same transaction," the
court allowed the contractor to defend debtor's adversary proceed-
ing by asserting the defense of recoupment.
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that a utility account and the
deposit which secures that account are part of the "same transac-
tion" for purposes of establishing a right to recoupment. Indeed, it
is difficult to imagine a set of facts more clearly requiring the con-
clusion that a creditor's claim against a debtor is part of the "same
transaction" than the deposit securing performance of a utility ac-
count scenario. In the context of a utility account, the utility agrees
to and does in fact provide service in return for money. The cus-
tomer, for his part, agrees to pay for the services consumed. The
role of a deposit, whether dubbed "advanced pay" or "security," is
nothing other than an integral part of the utility services agreement.
A party arguing that a deposit is an obligation "independent" of the
utility services account, an argument necessary for "setoff," is simply
closing his eyes to the common sense import of the phrase "same
transaction."
The conclusion that a utility account and deposit are part of
the "same transaction" is bolstered by analysis under the
"compulsory counterclaim" provision of Rule 13(a).96 A simple ex-
ample is illustrative. Assume that a utility customer provides a
See id.
Id.
See FED. R Cn. P. 13 (a) (providing that a defendant must assert a counterclaim "if it




$1,000 deposit to an electric utility to secure performance of his
utility account. The customer then fails to make payments, and is in
arrears to the utility in the amount of $1,500. The customer then
files a lawsuit to recover his deposit. The issue is simple: Must the
utility under Rule 13(a) assert its right to collect the amount owing
on the utility account against the customer in this lawsuit? If so, the
account and deposit must necessarily be part of the same
"transaction or occurrence" that forms the basis of the customer's
suit to recover the deposit. If not, the utility may simply defend the
action and assert by separate lawsuit its right to recover the amount
owing under the utility account. Given the courts' interpretation of
the same transaction or occurrence element of Rule 13(a), it is in-
conceivable that a utility would have the option of bringing this
counterclaim in a separate suit as a "permissive counterclaim" under
Rule 13(b) . It is also worthy of note that in this context the term
"transaction" is a word of flexible meaning, depending not so much
on the immediateness of the connection of the two claims, as upon
their logical relationship." Indeed, it has been held that "[t]he
spirit and intent of Rule 13(a) requires that the entire contractual
relationship be deemed to be included within the word
'transaction' in cases sounding in contract."99
C. Public Policy Favors the Recoupment of Prepetition Utility
Deposits
In addition to the overwhelming merits of the position that a
utility deposit is part of the "same transaction" as the account which
it secures, public policy also favors the courts to characterize the off-
set of a prepetition deposit as recoupment.
A primary policy argument in favor of characterizing the offset
of prepetition deposits as "recoupment" embraces the reality of the
routine nature of setoff under § 553. Specifically, if the offset of a
prepetition deposit is characterized as "setoff," a utility will be re-
quired to expend efforts and money prosecuting a motion for relief.
Given the fact that the Bankruptcy Code preserves a creditor's setoff
rights, it is not surprising "that ordinarily [if a] utility seeks relief
9' See 10 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY 7013.02 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed.
1993).
0, See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).
King Bros. Prods. v. RKO Teleradio Pictures, 208 F. Supp. 271,275 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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from [the] stay so that it can set off the pre-petition deposit against
the pre-petition debt [that] relief [will be] routinely granted."'' 0
Because a utility will routinely succeed in procuring the court's
approval of the exercise of its setoff rights, making utilities "go
through the motions" creates unnecessary costs which will ulti-
mately be borne by consumers in the form of rate increases. Tem-
porarily delaying the exercise of the utility's right to apply a deposit
against a delinquent account would seem to serve no purpose.
A second public policy basis for favoring the recoupment char-
acterization involves the regulated nature of utilities. Customers of-
ten lack choice in determining which utility provider to use in ob-
taining utility services. Utilities facing the prospect of having to
seek bankruptcy court approval as a prerequisite to applying prepe-
tition deposits may rationally react in one or two ways. First, the
utility may factor the inevitable cost of obtaining bankruptcy ap-
proval into the amount of the deposit it requires.'"' This could re-
sult in higher deposits being demanded of all customers. Second
and more importantly, a utility facing the reality that its deposit may
be, as a pragmatic matter, without value, may choose to terminate a
customer in default rather than demand a deposit. This choice
would be particularly rational in the case of a distressed customer,
the very customer which needs continued service to keeps its opera-
tion moving forward. Customers whose services are disconnected
will have nowhere else to turn for utility services.
VI. CONCLUSION
A deposit which is provided to secure the performance of a util-
ity account is, quite simply, part of the "same transaction" as the ac-
count itself. Even under the most restrictive state law definition of
recoupment, requiring that a right arise in "exactly the same" or in
the "identical" transaction, the nature of a utility deposit affords the
utility the right to recoup. Furthermore, public policy strongly sup-
ports a utility's ability to recoup a prepetition deposit against a
prepetition debt owed to that utility. Especially in the realm of util-
ity accounts, a transaction is a transaction is a transaction.
In re Norsal Indus., Inc., 147 B.R. 85,88 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
Although certain utilities are constrained by state law and regulation from demand-
ing more than a certain amount, nothing requires these utilities to demand the maximum
amount. See generally. Anderson, supra note 2.

